General Horii, Commander of the Japanese forces, moved the first of his disembarking troops forward, a body of some 2,500 soldiers, against the 39th Infantry Battalion and elements of the 49th and 53rd Infantry Battalions, some 400-strong. The Japanese force made contact with the outer positions of Maroubra Force and began frontal attacks against the dug-in defenders with the aid of a mountain gun and mortars manhandled up the Track.
Japanese reconnaissance had revealed a parallel track bypassing Isurava on the other side of the valley, defended by the Australian 53rd Battalion. A Japanese force was sent to open this route, and met with success, as the 53rd gave ground, retreating to the Track junction behind Isurava. Many senior officers of the 53rd were killed including its commander Lt-Colonel K.H. Ward, leading to further demoralization in the battalion. Had the Japanese taken advantage of a high track on the Isurava side of the valley they may have been able to drop down behind the Australian defenders atIsurava and cut them off. This would have meant certain defeat for our forces dug in at Isurava.
During the height of the battle late in the afternoon of the 26th August, , the first troops of the 2/14 Infantry battalion arrived to reinforce the 39th Infantry Battalion. Potts took command of Maroubra Force, and using the screen provided by the 39th Infantry Battalion, deployed the 2/14th Infantry Battalion at Isurava and sent the 2/16th Infantry Battalion to take over defence of the alternate track from the retreating 53rd Infantry Battalion. By the time the 2/14th Infantry Battalion had deployed, the Japanese were still able to field a force some 5,000 strong, and therefore outnumbered the Australians by at least five-to-one.
Japanese tactics were little-changed from the campaign through Malaya — pin the enemy in place with frontal attacks while feeling for the flanks, with a view to cutting off enemy forces from the rear. However, Horii was on a strict timetable; any delays feeling for flanks meant the gradual debilitation of his force from disease and starvation. As a result, Maroubra Force endured four days of violent frontal attacks. During the fighting, the 39th Infantry Battalion was forced to stay on instead of being relieved, as the Japanese threatened several times to break through the 2/14th’s perimeter.
On 29 August, Private Bruce Kingsbury of the 2/14th made a unique individual contribution to the campaign and was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross as a result. His citation read, in part:
Private Kingsbury, who was one of the few survivors of a platoon which had been overrun … immediately volunteered to join a different platoon which had been ordered to counterattack. He rushed forward, firing the Bren gun from his hip through terrific machine-gun fire, and succeeded in clearing a path through the enemy. Continuing to sweep enemy positions with his fire, and inflicting an extremely high number of casualties upon them, Private Kingsbury was then seen to fall to the ground, shot dead by the bullet from a sniper hiding in the wood.
Eyewitnesses said that Kingsbury’s actions had a profound effect on the Japanese, halting their momentum.
However, Australian casualties mounted and ammunition ran low. The Japanese threatened to make a breakthrough on the alternate track and Horii had now deployed several companies on the flanks and near the rear of the 2/14th and 39th Infantry Battalions, threatening an encirclement.
Outnumbered, Maroubra Force withdrew towards Nauro and Menari. Potts relieved the exhausted 39th Infantry Battalion and the shattered 49th and 53rd; they were ordered to make their way back to Port Moresby.
Tropical diseases in general, and malaria in particular, took a devastating toll in this campaign, outnumbering combat casualties by ten to one. While the Australian Army had encountered malaria in the Middle East, few doctors with the Militia had seen the disease before. The need for a strict anti-malaria program was not fully understood, and many men wore shorts and short-sleeved shirts after dark. Others failed to take their quinine, which was still the major drug in use, not having yet been supplanted by quinacrine (Atebrin). Many officers saw this as a medical rather than a disciplinary issue, and did not compel their men to take their medicine. Moreover, anti-malarial supplies of all kinds were in short supply.
The above information is taken from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kokoda_Track_Campaign#Battle_of_Isurava
